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 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati have constructed a fascinating 
thought experiment1 to restore rationality to a process that was once 
referred to as the confirmation “mess”2 but that is now described as 
“war.”3 They have, moreover, put their tournament into operation 
and composed a list of court of appeals “winners” from whom future 
Supreme Court nominees might be chosen and for whom the Presi-
dent could make credible claims of selection based on merit.4 
 As someone who has written about the pathologies of the confir-
mation process5 and has suggested reforms that are not particularly 
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University. I 
thank Mitu Gulati for sharing his and Stephen Choi’s excellent work with me and for sug-
gesting me for this Symposium. Thanks also to Jim Rossi for the kind invitation to con-
tribute, and to Bill Ross for reading and commenting on early drafts. 
 1. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004). 
 2. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994). 
 3. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role 
of Ideology, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 15 (2002-2003); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection 
as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2003); Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as 
War, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 393 (2002); see also David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of 
Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2005) 
(calling the process a “quagmire”). 
 4. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replac-
ing “Despise and Resent” with “Advice and Consent,” 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process]; Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue 
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viable politically,6 I can sympathize with Choi and Gulati’s sense that 
“the present Supreme Court selection system is so abysmal that even 
choice by lottery might be more productive”7 as well as their desire to 
find a solution, even one unlikely to be adopted in the form they pro-
pose.8 However, the tournament they propose is based on a number 
of unelaborated assumptions about the state of the Supreme Court 
appointment process that bear closer scrutiny.9 Despite my skepti-
cism about some of their assumptions, however, I think that a form 
of tournament could be extremely useful to all stakeholders in the 
confirmation process—the President, the Senate, interest groups, 
and the public. 
 Part I of this Essay examines the assumptions driving Choi and 
Gulati’s proposed tournament of judges. I conclude that those as-
sumptions may not be correct, or at least that they require some 
elaboration to support the strong claims that Choi and Gulati make. 
My criticisms are intended not to dismiss the proposal, but rather to 
encourage Choi and Gulati to refine it. They have already shown that 
a tournament can be run fairly easily,10 and that it can produce some 
surprising results.11 Explaining and defending their assumptions 
may increase the possibility that their proposal is taken up by par-
ticipants in the process. In Part II, I argue that if we abandon an ex-
treme form of the tournament, that is, “one that bars the president 
and the Senate from putting forth merit-related rationales outside 
[a] list of objective factors,”12 a tournament may be extremely useful 
to many of the interested parties in the selection and confirmation 
                                                                                                                     
Slip”: Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 75 (2001) [hereinafter Denning, Blue Slip]; Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirma-
tion Process and the Blue Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218 (2002). 
 6. See, e.g., Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process, supra note 5, at 31-
41 (proposing reforms to the confirmation process, including amending Senate filibuster 
rules, curbing power of committee chairs, curbing the use of the “hold,” and constructing a 
meaningful “advice” mechanism for Senators); Denning, Blue Slip, supra note 5, at 97-101 
(proposing reforms to the “blue slip” procedure in the Senate Judiciary Committee, includ-
ing making it a formal part of the Committee’s rules). 
 7. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 301. 
 8. Id. at 322 (“How likely is it that a proposal like ours would get implemented? In 
the form we suggest, there is no chance.”). 
 9. Please note that the brevity of the original essay is a point in its favor, and the au-
thors were quite explicit about wanting to open a debate. Choi and Gulati noted:  
Our essay serves only as a starting point. We hope the potential bene-
fits of exposing the politics involved in the selection of Supreme Court 
justices to greater scrutiny as well as introducing greater competition 
among appellate court judges will lead to an ongoing debate about how 
to reform our judicial system.  
Id.  
 10. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 4. 
 11. Id. at 80-81 (describing the surprisingly high performance of ranking judges re-
puted to be on Bush’s short list for Supreme Court nominations). 
 12. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 313. 
2005]           THOUGHTS ON A TOURNAMENT OF JUDGES 1125 
 
process. I doubt, though, that it could be as transformative as Choi 
and Gulati sometimes suggest. A brief conclusion follows in Part III. 
I.   EXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS IN A TOURNAMENT OF JUDGES? 
 A close reading of Choi and Gulati’s initial essay reveals five as-
sumptions driving their proposal: (1) politics should play a very small 
role in the selection of Supreme Court nominees; (2) the present level 
of politicization in the Supreme Court appointments process is aber-
rant and produces bad selections; (3) claims of “merit” by Presidents 
for their Court nominees obscure the politicization of the process and 
mislead the public; (4) a tournament will bring transparency to the 
process, exposing and diminishing the degree of politicization; and (5) 
nominees’ opponents and proponents can agree ex ante on objective 
criteria for the tournament.13 I argue in this Part that each of these 
assumptions either is questionable as a descriptive matter or re-
quires a stronger normative defense than Choi and Gulati offer. 
A.   Assumption No. 1: Politics Should Play a Very Small Role in the 
Selection of Supreme Court Nominees 
 Choi and Gulati repeatedly contrast “intellectual ability,” or 
“merit,” with “politics” and regard the two as virtually mutually ex-
clusive selection criteria.14 One aim of their tournament is to reduce 
the role that politics plays in nominations to the Supreme Court.15 
From this starting point, three additional questions arise, which are 
not answered by Choi and Gulati. The first is definitional: what pre-
cisely do they mean by “politics”? Second, why exactly should we seek 
to eliminate politics, however defined, from the process? Third, if, as 
they concede, total elimination of politics from the process is un-
likely, how much politics is optimal or acceptable?  
 Portions of their essay suggest that Choi and Gulati equate “poli-
tics” with “ideology” in the sense that selections are now made ac-
cording to how candidates are expected to vote on a set of discrete is-
sues.16 “The current selection criteria for the Supreme Court,” they 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See generally id. 
 14. See id. at 301, 302, 304, 305, 310-11, 312-13, 315, 316, 317, 320. 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 303 (arguing that selecting “future Supreme Court justices on the 
basis of . . . objective criteria would make clear (and thereby reduce) the role that politics 
plays in both the initial process of selecting a candidate and the often highly political Sen-
ate confirmation proceedings”). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 302 (“Our best guess is that politicians define ‘merit’ in terms of 
ideology, and argue accordingly. We suggest that a market-based system would be an im-
provement.”). In a subsequent essay, they clarify this a bit by contrasting “merit,” which 
“refers to more widely held views of what makes a good judge,” with “ideology,” which “re-
fer[s] to narrowly held views.” Choi & Gulati, supra note 4, at 27. As Choi and Gulati ac-
knowledge, it is still difficult to define ideology. Id. at 27 n.6. Moreover, the substitution of 
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write, “appear to be a set of political litmus tests on matters such as 
abortion, the death penalty, and affirmative action.”17 But then why 
not use “ideology”? After all, describing the selection process as “po-
litical” could mean other things—including (1) nominations calcu-
lated to appeal to certain interest groups or to members of the Senate 
and (2) nominations to repay presidential debts to political allies—or 
it could describe campaigning by or on behalf of prospective nomi-
nees. Indeed, elsewhere Choi and Gulati seem to condemn these 
manifestations of politics too.18 
 Lest I be seen as nitpicking, I think that a precise definition of the 
“politics” that Choi and Gulati condemn is necessary because of the 
normative question lurking in the background: Why should the con-
firmation process be insulated from politics? They seem to identify 
two problems with an overtly political selection process. First, there 
is the harm to judicial independence—political actors will seek to 
pack the Court with ideological proxies who will do their nominator’s 
bidding.19 Second, there is, they argue, harm in courts being seen not 
as impartial adjudicators but as employing a neutral façade to justify 
results predetermined by the deciding Justice’s ideological commit-
ments.20 
 But there is another way of understanding “political” judicial se-
lection. The two main players—the President and the Senate—are 
popularly elected and therefore presumably responsive to their con-
stituents. When a President nominates someone to the U.S. Supreme 
Court or when the Senate is asked to confirm that nominee, each is 
really deciding whether to confer on a nominee unreviewable discre-
tion to be exercised for as long as that person chooses to remain on 
the Court. The small number of cases that the Supreme Court now 
takes often places it squarely in the middle of highly contested cul-
tural conflicts—abortion, affirmative action, sexual privacy—and it 
resolves them outside the legislative process. At this level the legal 
materials are the least determinant, and resolution of the legal ques-
tions often requires the Court to weigh conflicting constitutional val-
ues. If de Tocqueville was correct that most political questions in 
                                                                                                                     
ideology for politics still leaves open the question of the appropriate denominator: How 
much (if any) focus on ideology should the system tolerate? 
 17. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 305 (emphasis added). 
 18. Id. at 312 (“Underlying most appointments, we suspect, are political agendas and 
the repayment of political favors.”). For similar observations to those made above, see Mi-
chael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 325, 327 (2005).  
 19. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 300 (“An effective constitutional democracy re-
quires an independent judiciary.”); id. at 310-11 (discussing the importance of judicial “in-
dependence,” defined as deciding cases “impartially,” that is, “independent of political ide-
ology,” and arguing that “[e]vidence suggests that judges fall short of this mark”). 
 20. Id. at 317 (“[A] tournament system should help reduce the appearance of political 
bias that exists today. Evidence reveals that who you get as a judge, in terms of political 
affiliation, can often affect the outcome of the case.”). 
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America become legal ones, then the Court is as much a political in-
stitution as the Presidency or Congress.21 Is it so wrong, then, for the 
President or Senate to seek some assurances—for instance, that the 
nominee thinks like the President or that a nominee is not outside 
the mainstream and might tip the balance on a closely divided 
Court—before judicial nominees are elevated to the bench and placed 
outside the ordinary electoral accountability? If this is the politics 
that Choi and Gulati want to eliminate from the selection process, 
they need to provide a more compelling normative justification. 
 Choi and Gulati seem to recognize that eliminating all politics, 
however defined, from the selection process is not possible. Presi-
dents, to a greater or lesser extent, have sought out nominees with 
whom they felt they shared certain values.22 The Senate has often in-
voked “political”—even ideological—concerns when rejecting certain 
High Court nominees.23 And yet the Supreme Court has not only sur-
vived, it remains one of the most revered organs of our government, 
even after Bush v. Gore.24 
 Choi and Gulati admit that their proposal “will not eliminate po-
litical considerations;”25 they even write that they are “not necessar-
                                                                                                                     
 21. It is important to remember that the subject of Choi and Gulati’s essay is selection 
for the Supreme Court, despite their article’s use of the word “judge” throughout. This is 
not to say that appeals court judges do not have similar discretion, but I would argue that 
they are at least not at liberty to overrule or disregard binding Supreme Court precedent, 
though they may have considerable discretion implementing Court decisions that are 
vague or ambiguous. For example, two recent decisions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals upholding Florida’s statutory prohibition on homosexual adoption and Alabama’s 
prohibition on the sale of sex toys, both decided after Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), show how much discretion lower courts have when implementing Supreme Court 
decisions. See Williams v. Attorney Gen., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 1335 (2005); Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). The same phenomenon can be seen in 
many lower courts’ treatments of the Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions. See, e.g., 
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003); Glenn H. 
Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme 
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369. 
 22. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A 
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 
(new and rev. ed. 1999); DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL 
POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999). 
 23. ABRAHAM, supra note 22, at 28-34 (discussing Senate rejection of nominees); 
CARTER, supra note 2, at 62-65 (discussing opposition to Thurgood Marshall’s nomination); 
MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATIONS 10-32 (1994) (discussing opposition to Abe Fortas’s elevation to Chief Jus-
tice). 
 24. See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Elec-
tion of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 541 (2003) (ar-
guing that a “reservoir of good will” built up by the Court enabled it to weather criticism 
over its resolution of the 2000 presidential election); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). 
 25. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 312. 
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ily against the inclusion of politics per se in the judicial nomination 
process”26 but merely want trade-offs (which they assume to exist) 
between politics and merit to be transparent.27 But these concessions 
raise a denominator problem: How much politics is too much, or what 
is the optimal amount the process should tolerate? 
B.   Assumption No. 2: The Present Level of Politicization in the 
Supreme Court Appointments Process is Aberrant 
 Whatever the optimal amount that politics should play in the pro-
cess, Choi and Gulati argue that politics is too prevalent in Supreme 
Court selection.28 They further suggest that current levels of politici-
zation are aberrant and that a less politicized selection process would 
produce Justices who are better qualified than those now chosen.29   
 The lack of an acceptable-level-of-politics baseline makes the 
claim that the current process is “overwhelmed by politics”30 difficult 
to assess. In his historical survey of Supreme Court selection and 
nomination, Henry Abraham wrote of Presidents’ consistent concerns 
with a “candidate’s real politics”—regardless of nominal party affilia-
tion.31  
The chief executive’s crucial predictive judgment concerns itself 
with the nominee’s likely future voting pattern on the bench, based 
on his or her past stance and commitment on matters of public pol-
icy insofar as they are reliably discernible. All presidents have 
tried, thus, to pack the bench to a greater or lesser extent.32  
Even George Washington, in an age before the official emergence of 
parties, “not only had a septet of criteria for Court candidacy, but he 
adhered to them predictably and religiously,” wrote Abraham.33 
David Yalof’s recent study of presidential Supreme Court selection 
shows every President from Truman through Clinton making politi-
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 305. 
 27. Id. at 303-04, 305, 312-13, 316, 318, 321 (referring to transparency). 
 28. Id. at 304 (describing the current selection system as “a biased and nontranspar-
ent process overwhelmed by politics”). 
 29. Id. at 301 (calling the “present Supreme Court selection system . . . abysmal” and 
blaming “politics” for its sorry state); id. at 304 (defending tournament proposal by 
“point[ing] out how badly the present selection system works without [objective] meas-
ures”). 
 30. Id. at 304. 
 31. ABRAHAM, supra note 22, at 49. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 53. They were:  
(1) support and advocacy of the Constitution; (2) distinguished service in the 
Revolution; (3) active participation in the political life of state or nation; (4) 
prior judicial experience on lower tribunals; (5) either a “favorable reputation 
with his fellows” or personal ties with Washington himself; (6) geographical 
suitability; (7) love of our country.  
Id. 
2005]           THOUGHTS ON A TOURNAMENT OF JUDGES 1129 
 
cal choices, either by instructing subordinates to find nominees 
whose “real politics” match the President’s (Eisenhower, to an extent; 
Nixon; and Reagan) or by nominating personal friends whom the 
President trusts (Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson).34 If later Presi-
dents, like Nixon and Reagan, have become more concerned with po-
sitions that candidates are likely to take with regard to specific is-
sues which come before the Court (like abortion), to the point of con-
structing disqualifying “litmus tests,”35 perhaps that is a rational re-
sponse to the increased role the Court has played in resolving con-
tentious social issues.  
 And yet, Abraham noted, “although a number of rather weak 
nominations have slipped past the Senate,” Presidents “have avoided 
nominating patently unqualified individuals to the high tribunal.”36 
Of course that does not mean that Presidents could not have made 
even “better” selections,37 but it is impossible to know how much bet-
ter those not chosen would have performed on the Court or to know 
how many “better” candidates were available to the President. That 
weak candidates38 are sometimes selected and confirmed does not go 
very far in establishing the truth of Choi and Gulati’s charge that 
politics has overwhelmed the selection process and that inferior se-
lections are made as a result. 
                                                                                                                     
 34. YALOF, supra note 22. 
 35. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 305 (“The current selection criteria for the Su-
preme Court appear to be a set of political litmus tests on matters such as abortion, the 
death penalty, and affirmative action.”). Democratic Presidents, too, can have litmus tests. 
In April 2004, Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry publicly announced that he 
would appoint only pro-choice judges to the Supreme Court. See Mike Glover, Kerry Under-
scores Stance on Abortion, CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 23, 2004, at A7. Subsequently, however, 
he softened that stance somewhat, suggesting that he might consider a pro-life judge, as 
long as Roe v. Wade is not threatened. See Jim Vandehei, Kerry Forced to Address Abor-
tion, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 6, 2004, at A11 (noting concern among supporters 
at Kerry’s remarks). 
 36. ABRAHAM, supra note 22, at 33. 
 37. Learned Hand and Henry J. Friendly are the usual choices for great judges who 
never made it to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. (“What a pity that a man of Hand’s intel-
lect and pen never became a member of the Supreme Court—he would have graced it from 
every point of view.”); id. at 214-15 (noting Lyndon B. Johnson’s refusal to nominate the 
“legal giant[]” Henry Friendly to the Supreme Court). Yalof’s study indicates that Presi-
dents bypassed candidates with arguably better paper credentials for various reasons. See, 
e.g., YALOF, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that Eisenhower “excluded a large number of 
qualified candidates from consideration either because they were too young, held jobs in 
private practice, served on trial courts, or worked for the administration”); id. at 79 (identi-
fying former Attorney General Robert Kennedy as “the main conduit for [President Ken-
nedy] in the selection process” and noting that his “strenuous objections” to Paul Freund 
“buried Freund’s candidacy even while it enjoyed the support of at least four other high-
level advisors”). 
 38. Abraham’s study notes that the Senate has not balked at rejecting nominees 
thought to be unqualified. Harold Carswell was the last such nominee, despite Senator 
Roman Hruska’s plea for the establishment of a “mediocre” seat on the Court. ABRAHAM, 
supra note 22, at 11 (describing Hruska’s “pathetic fumbling attempt to convert 
[Carswell’s] mediocrity into an asset”). 
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C. Assumption No. 3: Claims of “Merit” by Presidents for Their 
Court Nominees Obscure the Politicization of the Process and 
Mislead the Public 
 The prevalence of politics and the deleterious effects it has on the 
selection process, Choi and Gulati claim, are “disguised by claims 
about a particular candidate’s ‘merit.’”39 A tournament conducted by 
reference to ex ante criteria, they contend, will expose the gap be-
tween claims of merit made on behalf of nominees by their propo-
nents and those who won the tournament. “It becomes hard to argue 
that candidate X is the ‘best’ candidate on purely merit grounds,” 
they write, “when preexisting objective criteria presumptively sup-
port candidate Y.”40 If candidate X is chosen, then the burden of ex-
planation should fall on the President. “The public should know 
when a judge has been chosen because of ideology, and not because 
she measures up when objectively compared with contemporaries.”41 
 The argument for transparency itself entails a few questionable, 
or at least unverified, assumptions. First, assuming that “the public” 
is the audience for the information furnished by the tournament,42 
the authors must presume a role for the public in selecting Supreme 
Court nominees. Officially, of course, the public plays no direct role 
in selecting or confirming Supreme Court Justices.43 Indirectly, how-
ever, Presidents who consistently make shoddy nominations, or 
Senators who confirm those nominations (or refuse to confirm worthy 
ones), could be held accountable by the voters.44 Moreover, political 
scientists have found that when deciding whether to support or op-
pose controversial Court nominees, Senators will endeavor to gauge 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 301. 
 40. Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 305. “Where political motivations drive the selection of an alternative can-
didate, our proposed system . . . would make it more likely that such motivations would be 
exposed to the public.” Id. at 304; see also id. at 305 (“[W]here politics does impact the se-
lection of judges, such motivations should be made transparent to the public.”). 
 42. The authors are somewhat unclear on this point. While they frequently refer to 
the benefits accruing to the public from a transparent process, see, e.g., id. at 303, 305, 312, 
313, they also refer to transparency encouraging dialogue between the President and the 
Senate, id. at 313, and even providing a means for journalists to evaluate candidates, id. at 
322.  
 43. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (prescribing presidential nomination and Senate 
confirmation). 
 44. Indeed, this accountability was offered by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist 
as a check on the potential for cronyism by nominating Presidents and partisan obstruc-
tionism by Senators. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 428-30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). For evidence that votes against nominees made by popular Presidents 
can come back to haunt Senators, see Jeffrey A. Segal, Albert D. Cover & Charles M. Cam-
eron, The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 77 KY. L.J. 
485 (1988-89). 
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public support for the President, the nominee, or both.45 Perhaps 
Choi and Gulati believe that for the public to form opinions on nomi-
nees in order to exercise that indirect influence, the public needs the 
comparative information that their tournament provides. 
 But perhaps they simply overestimate the degree to which voters 
and Senators credit presidential claims of merit. Political scientists 
James Gimpel and Lewis Ringel have noted that while public sup-
porters of a particular nominee tend to tout the nominee’s objective 
qualifications—character, achievements, abilities, and the like—
opponents tend to frame arguments against the nominee in terms of 
the nominee’s perceived ideology or expected positions on key is-
sues.46 In another paper, Gimpel argued that one of the strongest 
“cues” for those holding opinions about nominees to the Supreme 
Court is the nominating President.47 “Public evaluations of the presi-
dent’s choice for the Court,” they conclude, “are shaped by judgments 
of presidential performance. . . . The president serves as a cognitive 
link between the citizen and the Court in the judicial selection proc-
ess.”48 This link, in turn, can serve as a cue to Senators as to whether 
they can safely oppose a presidential nominee.49 And when Senators 
are free to vote their preference, according to Segal, Cover, and Cam-
eron, they tend to want to vote against nominees from whom they 
perceive themselves as ideologically distant and vice versa.50 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See, e.g., Kathleen Frankovic & Joyce Gelb, Public Opinion and the Thomas 
Nomination, 25 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 481, 483 (1992); L. Martin Overby et al., Courting 
Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, 86 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 997 (1992). Frankovic and Gelb wrote: 
By two to one, Americans thought Clarence Thomas should be confirmed before 
the hearings [on Anita Hill’s sexual harassment allegations]. After they were 
over, they still favored confirmation.  
  . . . . 
 Many of the Senators decided to vote to confirm in the last hours before the 
vote. Multiple public opinion polls, done by media organizations, were available 
to Senators. Many surely used those polls to help make up their minds, or to 
justify minds they had already made up. The Senate was confused about who 
was telling the truth. Given the sensitivity of male Senators to a sexually 
charged confrontation, they sought to validate their position by recourse to the 
public’s judgment. 
Frankovic & Gelb, supra, at 483. 
 46. James G. Gimpel & Lewis S. Ringel, Understanding Court Nominee Evaluation 
and Approval: Mass Opinion in the Bork and Thomas Cases, 17 POL. BEHAV. 135, 139-40 
(1995). 
 47. James G. Gimpel & Robin M. Wolpert, Opinion-Holding and Public Attitudes To-
ward Controversial Supreme Court Nominees, 49 POL. RES. Q. 163 (1996). 
 48. Id. at 173. 
 49. Id. at 174 (“It is therefore not surprising that senators feel free to give Supreme 
Court nominees a harder time when the appointing president is suffering at the polls.”). 
 50. Segal, Cover & Cameron, supra note 44, at 485; see also Lee Epstein et al., The 
Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1168-72 (2005). 
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 In other words, if the political scientists are correct, Supreme 
Court nominees—all things being equal—will be confirmed if more 
Senators find the nominee closer to them ideologically than find the 
nominee ideologically distant. On the other hand, a President’s popu-
larity may cause some Senators to cast votes counter to their ideo-
logical preference, lest they suffer the wrath of voters at a later date. 
The public, meanwhile, will tend to judge a nominee based on its ap-
proval or disapproval of the President.51 Supporters will tend to focus 
on general characteristics—many of which speak to a nominee’s 
merit—while opponents will tend to focus on specific issues and on 
ideology generally.52 
 Perhaps more interesting is evidence of the willingness of mem-
bers of the public, when polled, to express their opposition to particu-
lar nominees in ideological terms—for example, “issue-specific con-
cerns such as abortion and affirmative action”—as compared to evi-
dence that members of the public who support particular nominees 
are more likely to state general reasons for their approval—for ex-
ample, “the nominee’s personal traits and experience.”53 This sug-
gests a certain sophistication on the part of engaged members of the 
public, who are aware that claims of merit for a particular nominee 
will be made in the larger context of a nominee’s ideological accept-
ability to the President. Certainly such an understanding exists 
among Senators, who often point out, when opposing a particular 
candidate, that they do not expect that the President (especially if 
the President is a member of another party) would nominate the 
same person they would. 
 None of these accounts, however, suggests that Presidents’ mere 
claims about a nominee’s merit are very persuasive, other than by 
virtue of the fact that the claims are being made by a popular Presi-
dent. Given the intense interest group activity that now surrounds 
Supreme Court nominations, members of the public for whom Su-
preme Court nominations are salient (and this still probably consti-
tutes a very small percentage of “the public”) will be subjected to a 
barrage of information—both positive and negative—about a nomi-
nee other than a President’s statements in support. It does not seem 
plausible that these members of the public would be taken in or mis-
led by presidential claims of merit. 
 Senators called upon to vote on the nomination will be subject to 
even more pressure and will have even more information to influence 
their vote. Even assuming that some members of the public might 
accept an administration’s claims of merit, Senators who wish to see 
                                                                                                                     
 51. See Gimpel & Wolpert, supra note 47, at 171-73. 
 52. See Gimpel & Ringel, supra note 46, at 139-40. 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 139-41.  
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a particular nominee defeated can use the information at their dis-
posal, as well as the national forum their office provides, to publicize 
negative aspects of a nominee’s record or question a nominee’s quali-
fications.54 Senator Ted Kennedy did this effective after the Bork 
nomination by making a speech on the floor of the Senate vehe-
mently denouncing “Robert Bork’s America.”55 
 One final thought: If members of the public at large are formulat-
ing opinions on Supreme Court nominees that are rooted in ideology 
and if, as the evidence suggests, undecided members of the Senate 
take heed of public opinion when deciding whether to support a 
nominee, perhaps the “politics” in the selection process that Choi and 
Gulati decry56 comes as much from the bottom up as from the top 
down. That is, if members of the public understand there to be an 
ideological component to judging and to judicial selection and people 
know that courts (especially the Supreme Court) have a role in re-
solving issues important to them, then perhaps Presidents and Sena-
tors will be forced to take account of public expectations as never be-
fore. Thus, we see Democratic presidential candidates vowing to ap-
point only judges solicitous of Roe v. Wade57 and Republican Presi-
dents pledging not to appoint “activist” judges. 
D. Assumption No. 4: Tournament Would Introduce Needed 
Transparency to Selection Process and Assumption No. 5: 
Possibility of Ex Ante Agreement on Objective Criteria 
 Assuming that there is a level of confusion on the part of the pub-
lic regarding Supreme Court selection that needs to be dispelled, 
would a tournament help? Choi and Gulati argue that a tournament 
would shed light on what they see as “a biased and nontransparent 
process.”58 But the success of a tournament in opening the selection 
process to scrutiny depends on the ability of potential antagonists in 
the process to agree, ex ante, on the “objective” criteria to which Choi 
and Gulati make repeated reference.59 If the selection process is al-
ready the subject of unhealthy politicization, as Choi and Gulati 
charge, one wonders what hope there is of getting Presidents, Sena-
tors, interest groups, journalists, academics, and members of the 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Segal, Cover, and Cameron offer evidence that Senators may oppose the nominee 
of even a popular President if they can raise questions about qualifications. See Segal, 
Cover & Cameron, supra note 44, at 485. 
 55. 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).  
 56. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 301. 
 57. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 58. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 304. For references to “transparency,” see supra 
note 27. 
 59. Id. passim. 
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public to agree on what objective criteria ought to be used and how 
they should be applied to potential nominees.  
 A possible response is that the transparency inherent in a tour-
nament, as Choi and Gulati suggest, permits criticism of the criteria, 
the criteria’s application, or both. However, to improve on an existing 
tournament, one need only use different criteria or apply the existing 
criteria differently. As improvements result in the formulation of al-
ternate tournaments, such tournaments would themselves be trans-
parent and open to criticism, which could lead to the fashioning of 
more tournaments, and so on. There could then conceivably be a 
Tournament among tournaments, with consumers of the information 
making choices among them. In that way, we might eventually reach 
a consensus regarding the set of objective criteria by which judges 
are to be measured.  
 But in the short run, this “let a thousand flowers bloom” approach 
would seriously reduce the possibility of dispelling confusion sur-
rounding the selection process. Those lacking independent means for 
discriminating among the competing tournaments might simply re-
sort to rough proxies. For example, liberal Presidents and Senators 
might use tournaments run by organizations such as the American 
Constitution Society or People for the American Way, while conser-
vatives might turn to the Federalist Society, the CATO Institute, or 
the Heritage Foundation. Even if there was an overlap in the “objec-
tive” criteria employed by these different organizations, I strongly 
suspect that there would be little overlap among the lists of pre-
sumptive candidates generated by interest groups or organizations 
from opposite ends of the political spectrum. 
II.   HOW TOURNAMENTS CAN AID SUPREME COURT SELECTION 
 While a tournament is unlikely to reduce the role of politics in 
Supreme Court selection significantly or have a dramatic impact on 
the behavior of the parties in the confirmation process, it may never-
theless be useful to help correct some of the process’s pathologies. 
Presidents may find it helpful to conduct a credible search that at 
least appears to reduce the level of “politics.” The Senate may use 
tournaments to construct a meaningful “advice” function that pro-
vides incentives for the President to consult with Senate members 
prior to selecting a nominee.60 Interest groups can use the tourna-
ment to compete with the decidedly opaque American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) evaluation process. Finally, a tournament, if used by in-
terest groups and the media, could provide a useful way of evaluating 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing the Senate’s role in Supreme Court 
appointments). 
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Supreme Court nominees without resorting to crude labels like “lib-
eral” and “conservative” or “activist” and “strict constructionist.” 
A.   Improving the President’s Selection Process 
 Despite the considerable discretion Presidents have in selecting 
nominees, they are inevitably constrained by political realities.61 As 
David Yalof has demonstrated, this fact (as well as differences in 
personality) has caused Presidents’ approaches to Supreme Court se-
lection to vary.62 Insensitivity to those realities can create problems 
not only for the nominee but also for the President, who can find that 
his “personal prestige and ability to influence other public matters 
suffer when the selection of a Supreme Court nominee fails to ade-
quately account for the hostile forces at work in the immediate politi-
cal context.”63 If recent struggles over lower court judges are a guide, 
the political landscape facing the current President and his nomi-
nee(s) will be a difficult one indeed.64 President Bush would do well to 
recognize and accept the political environment in which his Admini-
stration must operate; here, perhaps, the tournament might identify 
a nominee who would have a better chance at confirmation than one 
chosen through some other selection process. “Successful confirma-
tion politics,” Yalof sensibly concluded, “often depends on whether 
the president has made astute selection decisions during [the] earlier 
stages of the appointment process.”65 
 Yalof offered three models of presidential selection: (1) open selec-
tion, where decisions are made after vacancy; (2) single-candidate fo-
cused arrangements, where the President has someone in mind for 
the next vacancy; and (3) criteria-driven frameworks for selection, 
where “the president and his advisors set forth specific criteria to be 
met by prospective nominees.”66 Half of the modern nominees dis-
cussed in his book were selected by the third process.67 Yalof con-
cluded that this approach had the best potential for permitting 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See YALOF, supra note 22, at 4. 
 62. See id. at 4-5. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Yalof’s book includes a helpful discussion, listing ten “critical developments in 
American politics [that] substantially altered the character of the modern selection process 
for justices”: (1) the growth and bureaucratization of the Justice Department; (2) the 
growth and bureaucratization of the White House; (3) the growth in size and influence of 
federal courts; (4) the divided party government; (5) the increasingly public nature of the 
confirmation process; (6) the rise in power of the organized bar; (7) the increased participa-
tion by interest groups; (8) the increased media attention; (9) the advances in legal re-
search technology “for researching the backgrounds of prospective Supreme Court candi-
dates”; and (10) the more visible role of the Supreme Court in American political life. Id. at 
12-19. 
 65. Id. at 168. 
 66. Id. at 6-7. 
 67. Id. at 177. 
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Presidents to further the interests of their administration, though 
criteria-driven searches often require delegation to subordinates who 
might become involved in turf wars with each other.68 While Yalof 
was loath to offer “generalizations about relevant do’s and don’t’s in 
Supreme Court recruitment,”69 he seemed to offer qualified approval 
of the criteria-driven process, as long as one “eminently qualified 
presidential advisor” with political and legal savvy was in charge and 
the criteria chosen were not “overly restrictive,” which would pre-
serve flexibility and prevent “the quality of selection outcomes [from 
being forced] down to its lowest common denominator.”70  
 Based on Yalof’s study and his tentative conclusions, Choi and 
Gulati’s tournament could be of considerable help to an administra-
tion’s pursuit of a successful nomination and confirmation. Commit-
ting resources to identify potential nominees before a vacancy occurs 
permits Presidents to consider different strategies in the absence of 
an immediate need to make a nomination. Moreover, it permits a 
President to signal to other players that the selection of Court per-
sonnel is important to the administration. Running a tournament 
based on ex ante criteria could enable the administration to make 
credible claims of a merit-based approach, even if it is unlikely that 
the administration’s opponents will agree with the criteria that are 
used.71 The appearance of merit-based selection (even when con-
ducted within ideological constraints) might suffice to shift the bur-
den to opponents of the nominee to justify their opposition in terms 
of other criteria they would be obliged to disclose, as Choi and Gulati 
suggest, thus giving a President (all things being equal) a strategic 
advantage at the outset of the nomination. 
 The President may also be able to use a criteria-based tournament 
to offer key Senators a role in the selection process. Asking Senators 
to give names is always tricky: failure to choose a Senator’s preferred 
nominee can create an enemy (even within one’s own party), and 
given the present confirmation climate, Presidents need all the 
friends they can get in the Senate. Alienating Senators is as impolitic 
as it is unnecessary. But imagine a President inviting Senators to of-
fer criteria by which future selections ought to be made. Co-opting 
Senators by offering them the opportunity to construct the tourna-
ment both signals that the President respects the Senate’s “advice” 
role and helps spread responsibility. Candidates who emerge from a 
tournament that Senators had a role in constructing might have an 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 172-80. 
 69. Id. at 186. 
 70. Id. at 187. 
 71. See supra Part I.D. 
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easier time than those emerging from a process that did not involve 
the Senate at all. 
 However, unless a future President tries to employ a tournament, 
we will have no way to test the possibilities presented above. As 
commentators have made clear, a good part of a President’s success 
in nominating a Supreme Court Justice has less to do with the nomi-
nee and more to do with the perceived power of the nominating Presi-
dent.72 Moreover, a President may find his efforts to introduce objec-
tive criteria stymied by bureaucratic infighting among his own advi-
sors,73 by his own political commitments, or by the political context of 
the time. Perhaps Senators would not want to collaborate with the 
President, realizing that such collaboration may constrain their own 
actions in the future with regard to a particular nominee. Finally, 
any role for a tournament would depend at least in part on the level 
of a President’s interest in the Supreme Court and its personnel; his-
tory shows that this cannot be taken for granted.74 
B.   Creating a Senate “Advice” Mechanism 
 Charles Black once concluded ruefully that any sort of formal 
Senate advice mechanism no longer exists.75 But there is no reason to 
think that it is too late in the day to create one; Choi and Gulati’s 
tournament may offer a way to do so. Senators may lobby the White 
House to have their favored criteria included in an administration-
run tournament, which an administration may favor over the sub-
mission of specific names. Alternatively, Senators may wish to con-
struct their own tournament and publicize the names of the winners 
to pressure the White House to take account of their wishes.  
 Perhaps Senators could even offer an administration a deal: allow 
us to participate in some way, and we will guarantee “fast-track” 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See ABRAHAM, supra note 22, at 28 (listing “opposition to the nominating presi-
dent” as one of eight historical reasons for rejection of Supreme Court nominees); see also 
JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 128-40 (1995) (dis-
cussing the “wide range of resources for screening potential nominees and generating sup-
port for them” available to modern Presidents); Segal, Cover & Cameron, supra note 44, at 
506 (noting the likelihood of a nominee’s defeat “when . . . the political environment is hos-
tile to the president”). 
 73. See, e.g., YALOF, supra note 22, at 134-35 (“Reagan’s hands-off management style 
ultimately encouraged a disproportionate amount of conflict among advisors within his 
administration, each clamoring for influence over the final selection outcome.”). 
 74. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) (discussing lack of interest in judicial 
nominees on the part of the Clinton Administration); YALOF, supra note 22, at 40 (noting 
Truman’s “limited interest in most of the Court’s docket”). 
 75. Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court 
Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 659 (1970) (“Procedurally, the stage of ‘advice’ has been short-
circuited.”). I have argued that the “blue slip” that home-state Senators must submit to 
permit a judicial nomination to go forward can be seen as an effort to encourage Presidents 
to consult Senators prior to a nomination. Denning, Blue Slip, supra note 5, at 91-97. 
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consideration of nominees, including expedited hearings and a quick 
vote, as Glenn Reynolds once suggested.76 Under Reynolds’s proposal, 
the Senate would proffer a list of candidates to the President. 
This list would constitute the “advice” portion of the Senate’s con-
stitutional role. The President could then do one of two things—
she could select a nominee from the list, who would be presumed 
competent based on the Senate’s earlier screening and would be 
given approval according to some sort of accelerated procedure 
. . . , or she could select someone not on the list, in which case the 
confirmation process would take place as usual.77 
 Reynolds’s brief proposal did not include a discussion of the crite-
ria the Senate should use to compile the initial list, but the procedure 
he outlined neatly accommodates Choi and Gulati’s tournament. If 
Senators could convince the media, interest groups, and the public 
that their selection process was fair and nonpartisan by citing their 
use of “neutral” criteria, then Choi and Gulati’s prediction that the 
burden would shift to the President to explain his choice if it was not 
on the Senate’s list could prove accurate. 
 It would be ideal if, in either event, Senators from both parties—
perhaps those on the Senate Judiciary Committee—worked together 
to fashion criteria, or to run the tournament, or both. Wishful think-
ing? Perhaps, but such collective responsibility may give Senators of 
all parties reprieve from interest groups that pressure them to sup-
port or oppose particular nominees. Senators themselves have, of 
late, expressed frustration with the present process,78 and if the re-
cent wrangling over courts of appeals judges are any indication, the 
next Supreme Court vacancy will produce an unprecedented blood-
letting. Because Senators and the President realize this, perhaps 
now is an ideal time to propose an alternative to the mutually as-
sured destruction of the current process.79 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for Re-
forming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1579-81 (1992). 
 77. Id. at 1580 (footnote omitted). 
 78. For a sampling of complaints, see John Coryn, Restoring Our Broken Confirma-
tion Process, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1 (2003); John Coryn, Our Broken Judicial Confirma-
tion Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181 (2003); 
Orrin G. Hatch, At Last a Look at the Facts: The Truth About the Judicial Selection Proc-
ess: Each Is Entitled to His Own Opinion, But Not to His Own Facts, 11 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 467, 486-92 (2003); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as . . . Talk Radio, 
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 909 (2005) (quoting from Senators’ complaints). 
 79. We should probably take these expressions of frustration with a grain of salt. As 
Reynolds reminded us, 
[I]t may be that the process as it now exists suits a lot of people more than 
they want to admit. Presidents and presidential candidates are able to prom-
ise to appoint ideologues of one stripe or another to the Court—and, if they 
can slip the ideologues past the Senate, to fulfill their promises. Senators are 
able to posture and curry favor with interest groups . . . . And those interest 
groups themselves are given a potent tool for currying publicity and raising 
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C.   Ending the ABA’s Monopoly on Candidate Vetting 
 In the 1940s, the ABA began evaluating nominees to the federal 
bench. Presidents and Senators helped the ABA attain a role in the 
selection and confirmation of judges that was unique among interest 
groups. Acting on long-standing complaints by conservatives that the 
ABA was biased against conservative judges, the Bush Administra-
tion and Senate Republicans ended the ABA’s official role in vetting 
judicial nominees. The Administration’s action was criticized, and if 
Democrats retake the Senate (as they did briefly in 2001), the ABA 
may be restored to its prominent position.80 For those administra-
tions unhappy with the ABA, because of suspicions about its agenda, 
dislike of the committee’s penchant for secrecy, or its elite makeup, 
Choi and Gulati’s tournament offers an alternative that does not 
leave an administration open to charges—like those leveled at the 
current Bush Administration—of letting ideology drive selection to 
the exclusion of other considerations.  
 The ABA committee in charge of judicial selection is made up of 
fifteen lawyers81 who rate nominees according to “professional quali-
fications—integrity, professional competence and judicial tempera-
ment.”82 As Choi and Gulati note, the ABA’s vetting process in no 
way approaches a tournament because they evaluate only candidates 
who are nominated, the standards used are not objective or easily 
quantifiable, and the process (including the makeup of the commit-
tee) is not transparent.83 Though the evidence of political bias is 
mixed, the ABA has certainly been perceived as biased against 
judges nominated by Republican Presidents,84 a perception no doubt 
                                                                                                                     
funds. . . . If we do not depart from the present system, we will know that all 
the complaints about the process, from both the executive and the legislative 
branches, amount to so many crocodile tears. 
Reynolds, supra note 76, at 1582. 
 80. See generally Laura E. Little, The ABA’s Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial 
Candidates: Are We Ready to Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37 
(2001); William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Proc-
ess, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35-61 (1990) (discussing the role of the ABA and the litigation over 
its role in judicial selection). 
 81. The ABA president appoints the committee, which consists of “two members 
from the Ninth Circuit, one member from each of the other twelve federal judicial cir-
cuits and one member-at-large.” AM. BAR ASS’N, THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 2 (1999), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/scfedjud.pdf. 
 82. Id. at 4.   
 83. Choi & Gulati, supra note 4, at 35-36. 
 84. Compare James Lindgren, Examining the American Bar Association’s Ratings of 
Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000, 17 J.L. & POL. 1 
(2001), with Michael J. Saks & Neil Vidmar, A Flawed Search for Bias in the American Bar 
Association’s Ratings of Prospective Judicial Nominees: A Critique of the Lindgren Study, 
17 J.L. & POL. 219 (2001). See also James Lindgren, Saks and Vidmar: A Litigation Ap-
proach to Social Science, 17 J.L. & POL. 255 (2001); John R. Lott, Jr., The American Bar 
Association, Judicial Ratings, and Political Bias, 17 J.L. & POL. 41 (2001). 
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reinforced by the ABA’s public stands on controversial legal and so-
cial issues.85 
 Critics have charged that there is no good reason to privilege the 
ABA over other interest groups. Choi and Gulati’s proposal now fur-
nishes other groups—whatever their interest in the selection proc-
ess—with a tool for publicizing their own evaluations of judicial 
nominees, or for suggesting nominees who “win” their tournament. 
At the very least, perhaps the introduction of some competition into 
the nominee evaluation game would put pressure on the ABA to open 
up its process and refine the notoriously vague criteria that its 
evaluation committee uses. If such alternative evaluations were done 
conscientiously and developed a reputation for fairness and trans-
parency, administrations could choose to forego the ABA evaluations, 
yet they would be insulated from the charge that they were trying to 
shield their candidates from scrutiny or were pursuing a narrow 
ideological agenda. Even if having competing evaluations is confus-
ing because of the proliferation of information, as I suggest above, 
the net result would be more information that members of the public 
could either sort through themselves or, as is now the case, rely on 
specialists and the media to digest and report. 
D.   Creating a New Vocabulary for Debating Nominations 
 The last point—that to the extent the public has an opinion at all 
on judicial nominees, it is one inevitably shaped by information fil-
tered through interest groups and media outlets—is another problem 
for which Choi and Gulati’s tournament proposal offers a potential 
solution. When candidates are discussed, they are inevitably pigeon-
holed as liberal or conservative, as activists or practitioners of judi-
cial restraint, or as pro-business or pro-civil rights. Where such la-
bels are affixed to sitting judges (as Choi and Gulati point out, the 
next Supreme Court nominee will likely be a sitting judge),86 they tell 
almost nothing about the judge’s record, experience, or expertise and 
can, in fact, be extremely misleading. 
 A particularly disturbing trend among newspaper editorial boards 
is the tendency to condemn a judge because she “ruled against” a 
particular group (civil rights litigants, businesses, the state in crimi-
nal matters, and so on) a certain percent of the time.87 Such statistics 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See, e.g., News Release, American Bar Association, ABA Urges Congress to Reject 
Constitutional Amendment Restricting Ability of States to Define Civil Marriage (Mar. 23, 
2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news032304.html. 
 86. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 303 (“The norm today appears to be that a 
candidate for the Supreme Court must first sit on a federal circuit court of appeals before 
she may be considered for a seat on the Court.”).  
 87. For some examples, see Brannon P. Denning, Judge Noonan’s J’Accuse . . . !, 34 
CUMB. L. REV. 477, 500 n.174 (2003-2004) (book review).  
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tell little about either a judge’s abilities or her ideological disposition. 
They ignore entirely the underlying merits of the cases filed. More-
over, with lower court judges, a particular type of claim may be fore-
closed by precedent. Problems are compounded when one tries to as-
sign responsibility for the decision of multimember panels. 
 Using the number of times a judge is overruled or reversed is 
similarly unhelpful. A judge with a heavy caseload might be expected 
to have a higher number of reversals, which if converted to a per-
centage might be quite small. Appeals court judges are vulnerable to 
the whims of the U.S. Supreme Court. An appeals court could make a 
good-faith effort to apply Court precedent, only to have the Court 
adopt an equally plausible interpretation of its own precedent or re-
pudiate its prior decisions and proceed in an entirely new direction.88 
 Senate confirmation hearings do little to improve upon the media 
characterizations. My colleague Bill Ross has demonstrated that the 
often jejune questions posed to nominees by members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee—Senators presumably having a high level of 
interest and expertise in legal matters—show Senators wedded to 
the same reductionist dichotomies as the popular media. These ques-
tions in turn invite equally banal responses from the nominees them-
selves, who can perhaps be forgiven their reticence given the nature 
of the process.89 
 Choi and Gulati ask, “[W]hat if journalists today were to begin 
looking at the citation counts or publication rates of the Republican 
candidates for the court . . . ?”90 They predict that “[t]he tournament 
will have begun,” because comparisons would be made between 
nominees and other judges, criticisms would be made about the crite-
ria used, and new metrics would be put forward.91 Even if the result 
would be competing tournaments, with The New York Times running 
one and The Wall Street Journal running another, they, like compet-
ing public opinion polls, would have to disclose their criteria and 
would be open to criticism.  
 Such efforts would, one hopes, shape the debate so that the next 
Supreme Court nominee would not be asked about her favorite Jus-
                                                                                                                     
 88. For similar concerns, see Vladeck, supra note 3, at 1434 (“I am also skeptical that 
reversal rates would tell us much about the quality of court of appeals judges . . . .”).  
 89. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees Dur-
ing the Senate Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119 (2001) [hereinafter 
Ross, Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees]; William G. Ross, The Questioning of 
Supreme Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating 
the Needs of the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TUL. L. REV. 109 
(1987); William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search for a Synthe-
sis, 57 ALB. L. REV. 993, 1004-14 (1994).  
 90. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 322. 
 91. Id. 
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tice, or what Supreme Court decisions she disagreed with most,92 but 
perhaps, instead, about judicial independence, approaches to applica-
tion of precedent, and prior decisions. The tournaments, moreover, 
might generate information that could be used to educate Senators, 
who are often satisfied with bland and uninformative assurances 
about fidelity to precedent, affinity for Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
abhorrence of Lochner93 (or Korematsu94 or Dred Scott95), and vigor-
ous renunciations of judicial activism in any form. Similarly, solid in-
formation about a nominee that tournaments might provide could in-
oculate the nominee against charges of being “out of the mainstream” 
if the nominee is shown “objectively” to stack up well against her col-
leagues on the bench. Either outcome would be a welcome improve-
ment over the present system.96 
 Finally, it is worth noting that Senators have not yet decided 
whether it is publicly acceptable to oppose an otherwise-qualified 
Justice solely on the basis of ideology (save for nominees deemed to 
be “extremists”). It is generally accepted, however, that opposition 
based on ethical lapses or questions about a nominee’s integrity is 
perfectly acceptable. The process thus creates an incentive for Sena-
tors who might otherwise oppose a nominee based on her ideology to 
play ethical gotcha games with nominees to justify a “no” vote. Simi-
larly, since “extremists” are fair game as well, as I alluded to above, 
nominees sometimes find their records twisted to support an outcome 
made on other grounds. To the extent the tournament caught on, it 
might help expand the range of acceptable reasons to oppose a Presi-
dent’s nominees beyond impugning a nominee’s integrity or assassi-
nating her character.97  
III.   CONCLUSION 
 It is probably impossible to remove politics from the Supreme 
Court selection process. Even if it were possible, I am not sure it 
would be desirable, given the tremendous power Supreme Court Jus-
tices potentially wield. That said, I do not accept that we are stuck 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Cf. Ross, Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees, supra note 89, at 153-58. 
 93. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 94. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 95. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 96. See also Gerhardt, supra note 18, at 366 (noting that the media’s move from “re-
porting ‘hard’ news or facts and figures to reporting ‘soft’ news or speculation and commen-
tary,” due in part to the emergence of the twenty-four hour news cycle, has “put enormous 
pressure on newspapers and television reporters to emphasize scandal” with the result be-
ing that “[t]he media . . . prefers to stick to simple labels of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’”). 
 97. Cf. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 39 (1997) (“It may be that open 
and serious discussion of the nominee’s values, approach to the law and to decisionmaking, 
and declared policy preferences may have the salutary effect of reducing the temptation to 
do battle in highly personal terms.”). 
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with the pathogenic confirmation process to which we have become 
accustomed over the last twenty years. Politics and ideology have 
been employed as bases for opposition to Supreme Court nominees 
for nearly as long as the Court has existed. Yet only recently, it 
seems, has “war” become an appropriate metaphor for the process. 
Therefore, I applaud Choi and Gulati for rejecting the fatalism that 
has crept into discussions about the confirmation process and offer-
ing an alternative to it. 
 While not the depoliticized, objective, merit-machine academics 
might wish for, I believe that their tournament, or something like it, 
might be used to improve our present process. It offers the possibility 
for cooperation on Supreme Court appointments between the Presi-
dent and the Senate without either seeming to lose face or cede 
power. It offers a framework in which the Senate could revive a 
meaningful advice function. (If it served as even the beginning of a 
conversation between a presidential administration and Senators of 
both parties or simply spurred a bipartisan discussion among Sena-
tors about confirmation criteria, as it has among the participants in 
this Symposium, surely it was worth proposing.) Tournaments may 
create competition to produce the best measure for candidates, and 
may even spur long-time players, like the ABA, to refine their crite-
ria in order to retain influence. Finally, it may help reframe the 
terms on which debates over nominees are conducted. 
 In the end, nothing may come of Choi and Gulati’s proposal. Per-
haps, as Glenn Reynolds suggested, the present system suits the par-
ties just fine, despite their public protestations.98 But if we are still 
debating the confirmation wars ten years from now, academics 
should remind Presidents, Senators, interest groups, and members of 
the media that it was not for lack of alternatives that the process did 
not improve. 
                                                                                                                     
 98. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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